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.. 
1.  In  ·its  declaration on  i"ionet<:•rY  Compensstory. 1.\.rnounts  Cf·1C:~s)  the ·Coro·tlll.~.:;siot<  .. 
. told the  Council  that  it· I·Jas  car'r),.ing  c·ut  a.detaHed  ex;;,n:ination  of.  \-:hether  it 
would  be  opportune  to  use  the  Europ.ean  Unit·"'·f f.1ccount  (EUA)  for·  the  mechanisms 
of the  common  agricultural  policy  CCOMC77)  190  final  of  May  11,  1977). 
2.  .The  unit .of  account  presentl_y  used  in- the  CAP  \·las  designed  aLb  time  of-., 
stab•le  exchange. rate  relations  bet1~een all Member  S·<;:;;,tcs.·  Its  value  is  now· 
link~d ·to  the  Snake  currencies  and,. as  these  currencies .have  conti;nousL)'  revalued 
against  the  CommtJnity  average;  the  orientat·iun  Level  for  agricultural  production 
and  consumption given by  common  prices  in  units  oi'  account  has  risen.  The  EUA, 
··being  designed  on  the  basis  of  changing  exchange  ~ate relations  would  have 
reflecte.d·correctly the  average  economi,c··and  monetary  reality  in  the  Community.· 
3.  ·  But  the nse  of the  EUA  j_n  the  common, agricultural policy wou.lC.  not  l)y· __ 
itself result in any  fundamental  change  in ·trw ·impact  of. mo::1etary instability 
t h  .  lt  1  l  .  I-'- 1 - "  t.  .  j  •  ',...._-<:  on  .e  comrilon  ac;-rlcu  ura  po  :~.cy.  ~.  cou  cL  no.;  remove  .ne  ex1..s L:ln&  LJ.v/.)  gap 
betvreen national price  levels  and it would not  c::liminate  the need  for  MCAs, 
but  f'u.ture  I·iCAs  would be  distri  bu.ted in a  diffe:cent  fashion~ 
4"  In  ViCi'i'  of the  acivantages it \•rou.ld  bring,  tho  Commission  favoi.lrS  in 
principle the  introcluct ion  of the EUA  to :the  comr.1on  agricultural policy. 
5.o  Ho1-.rever,  the  Cormnission  considers that,  under present  circumstances,  the 
introduction of the E"liA  would raise  fundamental  questions  concerning the  con:mon 
~DTicultural policyo  Its implications require further  exa.l!ination,  and the 
Cormnission is not  submitting  a  proposal  at  the present.stageo  It intends to 
continue its exarr.ination of the question,  in li.aison with the f/Iember  States, 
-and rese:r.re.s the possibility of submitting a  proposal to the  Cotincil  at  a  later 
stage. 
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I. THE  AGRICULTURPd_  UNIT  OF  /\CCOLINT  fli·ID  ~10~!ET,\IH  [ll~VI:LOPI'lf.:NT 
.. 
6.  Since  1962,  a  unit  o·f  account  has  been  used  in  the  common  .JgricuLturc;l 
policy  to  express  common  agricultural  prices  and  amounts.  Thes~ are  then 
converted  into  national  currencies  by  means  of  a  set  of  conversion  rates, 
whith  were  intended  to  reflect  cur~ency parities. 
7.  The  single agricultural  market  - achieved  in  this  way- was  jeopardi-
zed  by  the devaluation  of  the  French  franc  in  August  1969  and,  two  months 
later,  by  the  revaluation  of  the  German  D-Mark.  The  governments  concerned 
found  it difficult to  accept  the  consequences  of  an  immediate  increase  in 
agricultural  prices  express~d in  French  francs  or  an  immediate  fall  in 
prices  expressed  in  D-marks. 
Both  parity  adjustments  were  regarded  as  exceptional  occurences,  and  it  was 
decided  that  common  prices  expressed  in  French  francs  and  in  D-marks  would 
not  be  adjusted  for  a  given  period  (three  months  for  the  D-mark,  and  t1-10 
years  for  the  french  franc).  In  ord~r not  to  distort  trade  and  the 
functioning  of  the  intervention  mechanisms,  it  was  necessary  to  introduce, 
~uring that  period,  monetary  compensatory  amounts  CMCAs)  to  cover  the  gap 
between  common  prices and national prices effcctiva on  the market. 
The  single  a,s-r:i.cul tural  raarket  was  to be  re:Tcorec3.  by  the  end of the 
period in  ~uestion. 
8.  The  1971  doLLar  crisis  led  to  a  general  floating  of  Member  States' 
currencies.  ~he  c6~m~nity dec1ded  to  retain  existing  conversion  rates  used 
fo~ the  purposes  of  the  common  agricultural  policy  (IMF  parity)  and  thus  to 
maint~in the  Level  of  agricultural  prices  expressed  in  national  currencies. 
It  ther'e·i'ore  introduced  non-compulso~y f'JCAs.  The  level  of  1'1CJi.s  ·for  each 
Member  State  was  determined  by  the  movement  of  its  currency  against  the 
dollar;  there  was  no  Comm0nity  financing.  Since  July  1972  (for  trade  with 
.  cornou L sory 
non-member  countries)  and  January  1973  (for  intra-Community  trad~)/ MCAs 
have  been  introduced  for  most  product~  and  are  financed  by  the  Community. 
9.  In  February 1973 represontative rates i·:Clr-e  introd.:;.accl..into. 
the  cornmon  agricultural  policy  as  the  means  of-converting  from  units  of 
account  into  national  moneys.  MCAs  are  no  Longer  calculated by  reference  to 
movements·  in  the  dollar  rate  but  by  reference  t·o  the  <lV~rage  movement  of  the 
Snake  currencies. 
• - 4 -
10.  The  Community  has  adjusted the  representative  rates  towards  market  or 
central  rates  both  during  the  marketing  year.~nd at  the  annual  price  reviews. 
But,  in  spite of  these  adjustments,  monetary  eve~fs··.have  ~Jidened differences 
for  most  currencies  between  representative  rates  and  market  or  central  rates 
and  this  has,  in  turn,  meant  a  widening  gap  between  national  prices. 
11.  The  Commission  proposed  Last  year  a  system  for  realigning  present  na-
tional  ~rices on  the  common  price by  means  of  the  phased  reduction  of  MCAs~ 
This  has  now  been  revised  and  is  being  re-submitted to  the  Council  CCOMC77)  432). 
The  Commission  will  also present  a  report  on  the  economic  and  financial  effects 
of  MCAs. 
II.  THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  ADOPTING  THE  EUROPEAN  UNIT  OF  ACCOUNT  IN  THE  COMMON  AGRJ-
CUL TURAL  POLICY 
12.  Since  1975,  the  Community  has  pursued  a  policy  of  standardizing  the 
units  of  account  used  in  the  different  spheres  of  Community  activity  by  adopting 
the  European  Unit  of  Account  CEUA)  for  the  European  Investment  Bank,  European 
Development  Fund,  the  Europea~ Coal  and  Steel  Community  and,  soon,  the  budget. 
Consideration  must,  therefore,  be  given to  whether  the  EUA.  should  also  be 
applied  in  the  common  agricultural policy. 
13.  As  par~  of  its  study  of  the  problems  arising  from  the  introduction of 
the  ~UA  into  the  common  agricultural policy, the  Commission  has  investigated 
the problems  arising  from  the  Switchover  itself,  from  the  evolution of  the  value 
bf the  EUA  after  Switchover  and  from  the  introduction of  the  EUA  into  the  annual 
price  review.  It  also  investigated the  budgetary  impact  of  the  introduction of 
the  EUA.  In order  to  assess  some  of these  problems,  the  Commission  carried out 
simulations  based  on  recent  data. 
The  EUA  and  the  Proble~ of  the  Common  Price  Level 
14.  Since  1973  the  value  of  the Agricultural  Unit  of  Account  CAUA)  has  been 
related to  the  Comiilunity  Snake  currencies  (1) •.  r  .. io.netary divergence  has  macle 
these currencies  lesr;  and less representative of the  econoi.1ic  a.'1d  monetary 
(1)  The  Community  currencies presently party to  the  Snake  or  joint  float  agreeincnt 
are  the  D-l'lark,  the  Dutch  Floi'in,  the  Belgian-Luxelnbourg  fr~nc and  the  Danish 
crown.  The  French  franc  Left  the  Snake  in  March  1976  having  rejoined it  in 
June  1975. - 5  ·-
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CoH·1.r:mni -t;y  population  <1~1.cJ.  c:.bout  GO)~  of int:rn.-Co;rJituriit,y  ac;::-iclJ.l  tl.n·.:-~l  tr2.c:o" 
Fv.rtlwrmore,  the  usc  of a  unit  of account,  based  only  on  tho  2c.--..a:~c 1  r::al-::es  it 
impossible  to corroct  ly  expr8ss  tl;e  movc;nc:1·i;  of  Snal~e  c·,~rrcncics ui  tL  respect 
to other  Corruuuni ty currencies.  'l'hcrefo:ce,  a.  part  of the  r8corclocl.  depl~ecia";;io·r" 
of the  •·:<::8.
1(<>.r  C"t<r:;.'c'1cics  ca~1  bo  considered as  an  apprccia.tio:;  iJ.Y  -Lhc  Sr:a.>:.i': 
.  ...  1  ~ 
l.loS0-L1o  A:1o'thcr  i·:a;/  of  c:;:precr;inr; this  p!l8nomono:'1  is that  tl:e  ave:rac;e  level 
of price  support  expressed in  so:no  national  c•_lrrencics  increased r:1ore 
rapidly  thd..l'"i  tlw  C'-.)17!1~1orl  p::.·ice  in.  u:1i ts of accou'1t.  'l'h8  evc•l  .,__-,t i o·1  of the 
COlTJ';lOl1  price is not  therefore  8..11  accurn.tc  i11d'~catoi·  of the  effe:cti  ._.e  18vel 
of common  }Jrice  suppox·t  in the  Community. 
The  value  of the  EUA,  on  tho  other  hand.,  r.:::flcc-7.G  the  c::..,Jero..c;c  c:urrc1; t 
econo:nic  anc1  monct<:-rJ  pe:ci'ori:l·::!.llC'2  of the  Cor,1r;n;.ni ty.  Its usc  t!':!cl·c:l"ore  1·;ould.  more:: 
closely reflect  8COllO;:Jic  .:L"lcl  monota:cy  realities in rclatio:J  to  -~:-,c  com:non 
a.:;-ricul  tur2.1  pol icy bat  its introduction wonl  cl  require  o.  dnci r.;i on  <lffectil'i[:  ::: b~ 
level  of common  ;:;.,r:;.cicnli.ural  p:cicef3. 
15.  Common  prices  and  amounts  fixed  in  units  of  account  are  a  main  element 
of the  Community's  economic  policy  in  the  field of  agriculture.  They  are  inten-
ded  to  direct  the  evolut~on of  agricultural  production  and  food  consumption 
and  to  influence  the  development  and  level  of ·income  in  the  agricultural  sec-
tor.  The  generalisation of  agricultural ·representative rates  that  are  different 
from  market  exchange  rates  has  Limited  the  effect  of  the  common  price  system. 
Indeed  production,  consumption  and  incomes  in  the  agricultural  sector  are 
more 'and  more  influenced by  different  national  expressions  of  the  common  price, 
these  "national"  p·rices  being  higher  than  the  common  price  in  count1·ies  1-.rith 
appreciated  currencies  (those  with  positive MCAs)  and  Lower  in  countries  with 
depreciated  currencies  (those  with  negative  MC~s).  Denmark  is  the  only  Member 
State  where .the  "national"  price  and  common  price  are  the  same.  The  gap  between 
the  highest  and  Lowest  national  expressions  of  the  common  price  is  now 
about  40%  (see  Figure  1). 
But,  even  if different  national  prices  have  becone  a  part 
of  economic  reality,  common  prices  rem~in the  fundamental  element  of  the 
Community's  price  policy,  because,  they  remain  the  cornerstone  of  the  annual 
price  decisions  and  because  they  still determine  most  of  the  price  rela-
tionships  between  agricultural  commodi-ties  in  each  of  the  national  markets. 
It is  Corr.munit}'  policy to  realign  the  different  "national"  prices  by  eJ.irnitJ::::;~}_:·:.:.:: 
ECAs. FIGURE  I  :ILLUSTRATION  OF  THE  EFFECTS  ON  THE  COMMON.PRICE  LEVEL  OF  THREE  HYPOTHESES  CONCERNING  i~E  CO~VERSION 
RATES  BETWEEN  THE  AUA  AND  THE  EUA 
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Situation  Switchover  to  the  EUA  according  to  : 
on  1  June  1977  Hypothesis  A  Hypothesis  B  Hypothesis  C 
National  price  in  Germany  ALIA  MCA  EUA  MCA  EUA  MCA  EUA  MCA 
expressed  in  AUA  (1) 
Common  price level------
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(1)  For  the  purppses  of  this  graph  it  has.becn  assumed  that  on  the  day  of  Switchover  to  the  EUA  MeA's  arc 
refixed  so  Yhat  the  existing  national  prices  are  maintained. 
(2)  Re~l  Goneti~y gap,  the  ap~lied gap  being  32,3 % (Sec  Table  1) 
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fl  decision  to  .:Jdopt  the  Ell·~  1"ould  rne0n  th~t, aher the  O<J)'  of 
d  l '  1  )r'-~"'"o'  ,·n  1:UA.  The  diffcrcn- .  1  0n  prl.Cf'S  c·;n  ar11v-unts  \JOU  a  1)e  €Xf  o::.-.•  "oc:  '- SwltC 1over,  comm  -
L  l  '- 1e·t\·JC'."'.n  ti",..,  fiU,A  "rld  the  liJo'~  \Wuld  nc~ce~~sita'Lr::  ces  in  nationa  mo~ey  va  ues  l  ~  ·~  M  u 
a  decision on  the  conversion  rate  to  be  used  ~t  the  moment  of  Switchover. 
This  11ould  raise  the  question  of  the  Level  o·f- the.cot:lmon  price to  1-Jh-ich 
~CAs 1"ere  eliminated  in  the  future.  On  the  Member  States  would  converge  as  1 
day  of  the  switchovcr,  assuming  unchJnged  prices  in  national  currencies,  this 
.  -·  ~ 
·  ....  L f  as  a  nos  s ,· b l e  r· e d i s t  r ·i b u i:. i on  of  f·l C/\ s  ( see  F  1 9 u r c  -<  1 •  problem  would  present  lLSe  - ~ 
16. 
OYlC  ex-treme,  the  coJ<vcrsior..  rate could.  b0  chose:1  so .-!;}:;;;.t  the  com;.-:on  price  - i  .c. 
that price to which all national  prices tended as MCAc  were  phased  out  - ~ac 
fixed at  the level  of the  present  Gernau price.  At  ttc other  c~tremo,  the 
conversion rate could ·oc  ci:o:scn  so trlat  the  CO::ll.lOYl  price -;-,•as  fi:;.:ocl  at  the  level 
of the  pre[;ent  Uni·l;ccl  Ki:-1gclom  price. 
1l
1hc  effect  of  t!·1c:  firc-t  coJ:version  rc:.Le 
v!Ould  be  to  reduce  the  Gerrr1an  J.i(;J\  to  zero  ancl  to  redistrilmte  other  T-1CAs  so 
that  they all  became  ne::;-o'J.ti vc,  the effect of  the:  second.  to  reduce  the Uni  tecl 
Kingdom  r.!CA  to  ?.ero  <1z'.d  to-redi:;tribute  other 1-iCAs  so  that  thc:r all became 
positive. 
17.  The  Co:a:::1is~;;icm  cleveloperi  thr'3e  l1ypoth0scB  l;ying het1·Joen  t:'1o:-~e  two 
extremes  to  invcsti[;'C.tte  tbe  problem  of the  converr>ion  rate  n:~d its effr.ct  on 
tho  common  price level.  Simulations of the  S·  .. ritchovcr  \·;ere  carr·i•'O)cl  o;;.t  on  the 
basis· of du.",;w.  for  June  1  1976 and the results have  been anai:/sed  to  sl10\·r: 
(a)  'i'he  effect  on  the  value  of tl:e  AUA  price::;  e:-~pr'('8scd  j_:-,  nacic:·"al  ct:rrenc:j_es 
at  ccmtral  or  maTket  ra·~e:o-..  This is the level  to v1hich  nati(>~'lal  prices 
t-:oulcl  tend as  I.TCAs  t-rero  eliminated. 
(b)  The  effect  or!  comJ,~on prices  c:t.Yld  amounts  expressGd as the  HeigJ--,ted  averac;u 
of existin;; natio:ne1  prices in all  m.em1)er  statcE;,  j_ .e. pricc"s  converted 
0~1  ·i;he  uu..siG  of existing representative ra-tes. 
Hypothesis  A  in  the  simulations  merely  substitutes  an  equal  quantity  of  EUAs 
for  a  given quantity  of  AUAs.  The  results  of this  would  be  : 
a)  Common  prices  and  amounts  expressed  in  EUA  would  be  nominally  the  same 
as  in  /\Uf-1.  For  example,  a  price of  100  AUA  t.Jould  become  on  the  day  of 
Switchover  100  EUA.  But  the  money  value of  the  AUA  prices  would  fall  by 
16%  because  the  EUA  is  l·JOrth  Less.  If the  S\·Jitchovei·  had  been  r.1ade  in 
June  1973  the  Loss  of  value  would  have  been  practic~lly nil  because  at 
that  time  the  AUA  and  the  EUA  had  an  equal  worth. 
b)  The  value  of  the  Level  of  common  prices  d~fined as  the  weighted  average 
of  existing  national  prices  woul~ fall  by  7r9  %. 
Hypotho2sis  B  in  the  simulations  in  effect  keeps  almost  unchonged  the  weighted 
average  of national  prices  that  would  exiit  if green  and  central  rates  and 
green  and  market  rates  \-Jere  aligned  just  before  the  Sl-Jitchover.  TIH::  coefficient 
of  co~version between  the  AUA  and  EUA  has  been  calculated  as  the  weighted 
aver~gc difference  between  EUA  rates  and  central  rates  in  the  Sna~e  currency 
cou:~tries. - 8  -
a)  The  common  prices  and  amounts  expressed  in  EUA  would  nominally  be  19,2% 
greater  than  in  AU/\.  r-or  example,  a  price of  100  f\UA  vwutcl  become  on  the 
day  of  Switchover  119,2  EUA.  But,  due  to the  L6wer  value  of  the  EUA,  the 
money  value  of  AUA  prices  wouLd  neverthel~ss  remain  almost  unchanged. 
b)  The  value of the  Level  of  common  prices  and  a~o~ots d2fined  as  the  weighted 
~verage of existing  n~tional prices  would  rise bv  9,8  %. 
~thesis C  in  the  simulations  keeps  unchanged  the  weighted  average  of  nvt ionaL 
prices  existing  on  the  day  of  SwitchoVer.  The  result  of this  would  be  : 
a)  The  common  prices  and  amounts  expressed  in  EUA  would  nominally  be  8,6  % 
greater  than  in  AUA.  For  example,  a  price  of  100  AUA  would  become  on  the 
day  of  Switchover  108,6  EUA.  But,  due  to  the  Lower  value  of  the  EUA,  the 
money  value  would  fall  by  8,9  %. 
b)  The  value of  the  level  of  common  prices  deiined  as  the  ~eighted average  of 
existing  national  prices  would  remain  uncha~ged. 
18.  These  simulations  demonstrate  the  critical  nature  ~or the  common  pric~ 
Level  of  the  conversion  rate  to  be  used  between  the  AUA  and  the  EUA.  The  diffi-
culties  surrounding  the  choice  of this  conversion  rate  arise  from  the  fact 
that  there  is  no  single  economic  relationship  between  the  two  units  of  account 
that  is  applicable to  the  whole  Community.  The  difficuLties  could only  be 
resolved  by  a  political  decision  ta}:ing  full~.r ir1to  o,ccou:1t  the  c.f.foctc  ·r.ta·:~ 
the  differc11~ possi))le levels of  oo:r..:-r:on.  pric:es  coulcJ.  finall;y  ]·;ave  on 
agricul  tu.ral  prices,  prod.1.-cction  income  ~•r.l the budget. 
19.  However  prices  in  national  moneys  need  not  immediately  be  affected  by 
the  common  price  Level  implicit in  the  chosen  conversion  rate.  Prices  in 
national  moneys  existing  at  the  moment  of  Switchover  could  temporarily  be 
maintained  by  an  appropriate  set  of  green  rates. 
In this  Light,  the  choice of  the  conversion  rate 
would  amount  to  a  decision  on  the  redistribution of the  stock  of  MCAs  existing 
just prior  to  the  moment  of  Switchover. 
The  EUA  and  Monetary  Compensatory  Amounts 
20.  Monetary  instability - as  experienced  since  1973  - disturbs  one  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  common  agricultural  policy,  namely  the  sin~Le 
market  established  through  a  set  of  common  ~rices and  amounts.  This  is  true 
whi cht.:ver  unit  of  account  is  d  ·  ·  ·  use  ~o express  comrnoo  pr1ces. _Price  stability 
in  t  f: ·j s  s i n  n.·J  L  e  m  a r l< r>  .. t  1.  s  o tl e  o ·'  t h  b ·  '  ·  f  •  r.  eo }ece1ves  o  t11e  common  agricultural 
policy  :  ~brupt  price  changes  caused  by  exchange  rate  movements  would  be 
unacceptabl~ to  f~rmers  and  consumers. - 9  .. 
In  order  to  presei'VC  price  stab'il-ity  at  a  t:·i1ne  of  monctai'Y  upheaval,  the 
common  ogriculturaL  policy- as  ~1Lt'eady  described  in  :J~.1rt  I- has  it1troduc('d 
as  its  own  const~nt  conv~~sion  .. rates  and  this  has  implied 
the  pc:.yment  of  f~CAs  in  trade.  The  need  for  constant  co:wersion  rates  ;::ncJ  the 
resulting  MCAs  is  not  altered  by  the  nature of the  unit  of  account  used .in  the 
common  agricultural  policy. 
The  adoption  of  the  EUA,  therefore,  cannot  by  itself  remove  the  impact  of 
monetary  instability  on  the  common  agricultural  policy.  But  it  could  affect  the 
distribution of  the  stock  of  MCAs  existing  on  the  day  of  Switchover  (§  21)  and 
it  would  affect  the  flow  of  new  MCAs  afterwards  (§  22).  The  modalities of the  NCAs 
themselves  would  also  change  C§  23). 
21.  The  choice  of  the  conversion  rate  between  the  AUA  and  the  EUA  could 
have  <Jn  i1ornedia:te  effect  on  the  distr·ibution of  f•':CAs  existing  at  th2 
moment  of  Switchover.  This  was  also  studied  in  the  simul<Jtions  and  the  results 
are  surnmCirised  in  the  folloTing  table.  This  compares  the  distr·ibution  o·f  1\iCAs 
that  existed on  1.6.1977  with  those obtained  from  the  conversion  rates  used  in 
the  three  hypotheses. 
Table  1  actual  MCAs  and  MCAs  resultinq  from  the  introduction  of  the 
EUA  on  June  1,  1977 
f1pplied  I\1CAs  f'JCAs  resulting  from  tile  app l i cation  o·f 
f11ember  State  the  Eur~  on  1.6.1977  Hypothesis  A  Hypothesis  B  I  Hypothesis 
Germany  +  7,5  22,0  7,0  15,3 
Netherlands  +  1,4  18,1  2,4  11 r 1 
BeLgium-Lux.  +  1,4  17,4  1,6  10,3 
France  - 14,5  3,3  - 15,2  -- 5,0 
Ireland  - 4,6  11,1  - 6,0  3  ,L~ 
·It  a ly  - 14,8  2,9  - 15,8  - .  5  5  .  r 
·Denmark  0  16,5  0,5  9,3 
United  Kingdom  - 32,3  - 12,1  - 33,7  - 21,7 
1 
c I 
! 
I 
22.  The  simulations  demonstrated that  the  flow  of  new  MCAs  resulting  from  the 
evolution  of  the  EUA  ~·i.e.  the  dynamic  dfect  o·f  the  EUA  on  the  Dl'ice  level-
t-1oulcJ  be  the  sauie  1-l-1  ctever  the  conversion  rate  chosen  for  the  s~.ritchover.  ~']-;,, 
... 
(ljr;Lri'lJution  hct\·Jr;en  i.Icrt,l!c.;l'  States v;oulr.l  ho\·!Wvcr  r;c:  J:JOl'G  :~.J:i.c,;--;c~cl  ~>2!d  tl,o:cc 
1,l01.llcl  bn  "  g.rc.:-::1. c::.·  num1Jor  of I.lCA  Cfl2.!"'i(;88  cornpa.l"c6  \·:i th  tho  cvoJ.uti o·:l  actuall;:/  .. 
0l)SCY'V8cl  OVC'.r  t])  i  F3  pcriocl  on  the  '  .  of the  ADA  (Gee  Tal.:Jlo  2)  ua.sl8  . 
,. 
i·-
i 
I  ,. 
' .  .  ,•  - ·--. 
~-r  ..  ~•--;--·-.;..·.-.... ~*-'"•  ............ ....;t.;:<;,....p.l...;""'·___,---...'-'-'-'-··,  ..  ~;.-,;.,..;:......,.~--... ...  -.. - •• ---~.....-~-~  ............  -...........,._..~~."""  .. _  .... ~- ..... )o;'.-·---..-·- .qf,.-.  : ... .. ____  - -·- ::.--
Member 
States 
Germany 
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The  crcnt·ion of  gr<:.•;Jter•  ro:>itivo  f·1Cflr:  'in  tilt:  ,,cried of  the:  !limultJt·lon  r·cdlccts 
the  appreciation of  the  Snake  currencies  vg<:dn.st  t·h£:'.  Community  avert;ge  during 
that  period. 
Table 2: ..'if.:pothetic~l-.~.net~a-s  resulting  after  the  vdoption  of  the 
European  Unit  of  Account  on  Janu0rv  1  1976  without  takinq  account 
of  the  stock  of  MCAs  nt  the  moment  of  Switchover  (1) 
Simulated  monetary  .f.i<lp  using  EUA  :  J  Simul.:::t~·d 
)'ion_etary 
1975  1976  1977  gap  on 
19.9.77 
31.12  31.3  30.6  30.9  31.12  31.3  30.6  19.9  using  AUA 
( 2)  -
0  +  6  +  7  +  11  +  12  +  12  +  13  +  13  :+  :2 
Net her Lands  0  +  3  +  4  +  8  +  11  +  10  -!·  10  +  10  0 
BeLgium-Lux.  0  +  4  +  6  +  9  +  11  +  11  +  11  +  11  0 
France  0  0  0  - 5  - 7  - 7  - 7  - 7  - 20' 
Ireland  0  - 2  - 8  - 15  - 16  - 13  - 14  - 14  - 28 
Italy  0  - 18  - 16  - 19  - 24  - 24  - 25  - 26  - 43 
Denmark  0  +  4  +  6  +  9  +  9  +  9  +  5  +  3  - 13 
United  Kingdom  0  - 2  - 8  - 15  - 16  - 13  - 14  - 1  It  - 28 
' 
(1)  Table  e:::;tabliched ;::wsumin[;  a  franchice  of  Cj~  a~1u ;nodific<ltions  of tlle  monet<lr:y  cap  oach 
time  the calculated nmv  gap  cliffers  1/~  from  the  old one.  It is as::mmocl  that  !10  0'8Ci1 
rate ad<lptations  have  taken place  since  January lt  1976. 
(2)  To  provide  ij  comparison  with  the  simulation,  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  actual  stock 
of  MCAs  on  January  1  1976  was  zero  and  that  no  green  rate  adaptations  have  since  taken 
PLace. 
.,. 
23.  ~1CAs  are  calculated  with  reference to  the  Snake  currencies.  Therefore 
'MCAs  for  those  Community  currencies  in  the  Snake  are  fixed  and  those  for  freely 
floating  currencies  are  variable.  As  the  introduction of  the  EUA  would  not  alter 
the  need  to  fix  MCAs,  the  persistence of  monetary  instability·bayond the  day  of 
the  Switchover  would,  together  with  the  desire  f?r  stability  on  agricultural 
marketsr  create  a  flow  of  new  MCAs  modifying  the  existing  stocks.  The  application 
I 
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of the  EUA  would- since  no  currency  has  a  fixed  relationship  ~oJith  it- result  .. 
in  MCAs  that  were  variable  for  all  currencies  because  a  variation  in  the  value 
of  one  currency  \·~auld  affect  the  l·iCAs  of  all  curt·enc ies. 
This  change  would  affect  the  14%  of  Community  agr·iculturaL  and  food 
imports  (intra  and  from  third  countries)  and  27%  of  exports  at  present  taking 
place  under  fixed  r~CAs.  'l'}JO  rc;c;t  of tl1o  'Lra.dc;  alr~ady  ta.l~cs  p1.:-,.cc  un(l.€'r  th;; 
present  r;;r<:t0.m  >·!ith ·mrir:.bls  ;·.':.:1\r;  Pr 1·.'i.tl1c1J.L i'Gfif;. 
,. - 11  -
2,1.  Ticprcscntati  ve  r<1tcs  arc  cur::Tntly  "b~'on,:;ht  more  in lhJC  \·:i·;·}l  :;~c:.r::ct 
cxr;}~c.nc;c  r.:1-tc:.;  tnroU£h  <1d-hoc  dccicion:::;  by  t1K~·· Cou;-:.cil.  All  these  rJc,::,icions 
.... 
lJ<:~c  YJOiv  resulted in the  build-up  of  a  lc:.rr:;e  ctoc.l: of J.:cAr:;  l)ecu.usc  of  in~;<-lifi-
c:i.cnt  ~.djnc·~;r,cnt.  But  the  11roblc:n  o:f  o..daptinc  rcprc:~cnto:tivc  r.;:l:es  to  r:Jorkc-t 
cxcJWDCC  rates exists Hhatcver w;it  of account  ic used  in the acriculturo.l 
11olicy.  !tl  though  the  use  of tho  EUA  could provide  a  rr.o:rc  balanced reference 
point for reGular adjustments  of representative  ret.tes,  a  cliffcrent distrilmtiD:'l. 
of ECAs  bch;ccn !.-Iomber  Sta.tcs  ,.;ould  not  necessarily resolve  the political  <:mel 
cco~omic difficultieo  inherent  in the process  of adjustment. 
2).  rl'he  int:::·oduction  of the  Eul'opcan  Unit  of Accolmt  into the  8sricunu.:..'a.l 
pol  icy  vlOulrl  r·equire  that  the  same  ru1i t  of acco1Jnt  Has  ur~ed  in the  a:rmuo.l  price 
fi:dnr:;.  In the  recent  period of monetary  instability  1  tl1c  Snake  currencies 
shOl'TCd  a  more  substantial appreciation ac;ainst  the  EUA  than  ngo.ins·l;  the  ADA. 
This means  -that  a  given price  rise in national currencies is shown  as  a  lm·mr 
price  rise  in the  common  price  level expressed  in AUA  than if it were  expressed 
in EUAo  For example  the  "objective method"  used in the  annual price  round  to 
calculate  the  "needs"  for price  risefi to maintain  the  relative  income  of fanners, 
indicated  a  Oo4  %  price rise  in AUA  for  the  campaig-n year 1977/78.  Had  :the 
EUA  be.en  used,  in this case  the  same  price  adjustments  in national currencies 
would  have  required  ru1  11 %price rise  in EUAe  It is difficult to assess  the 
possible  impact  of these  purely presentational differences  in the  results of 
the  hJO  systems.  It should be clear,  however,  that given price rises decided 
in AUA  in the  past  few years  appeared much  less substantial than they Hould 
have  seerr.ed if they had been expresses  in EUA.  If,  on  the  other hand,  the  evo-
lution of the C  omm.uni ty curr•3ncies  in future  were  to follow  a  different  co<.1rse  in 
relation to  eo.ch  other,  the  application 6f the  EUA. in agTicul  ture  Hould  have  a 
different effect.  The  ~ssential feature  of the  EUA  is that,  whatever  the 
relative movements  of the Community currencies,  it \·lOuld  provide  a  unit  of value 
more  rcpre sent  at  i ve  of the  economic  and monetary performance  of the Community. - 12  -
The  EUA  and the  Community  buc.get  .. 
26.  'I'jw  introduction of the  I:~UA i'or a.:;riculh'.ro  v101.~ld.  have  110  iiTJ110diate. 
c:ffcct  on  P.i~-:OGA  guar?.ntcc;~  expenditure  1  s:i.ncn  it is  et'fcct  :i.vcly  dc-termir..c;:d .by 
the  prices ruling  in national  currencies Hhich by dof:i.rd  tion remain 1.mc,hanged." 
'l'hcre  Houlc"i. 1  hm-;cvcrs  be  some  redistribution of this unchanged  total bet-v10cn  ' 
the f.1emr;er  S-tates. 
27. ·  Hhen MCAc  arc phased  ou.t 1  hoHcvert  the budgetary position would vary 
considc·ral)ly depending  on the  rate of conversion between the·  :AUA. and  :the  E'JA. 
used when  the  EUA  -vm.s  adopted.  Under  cypotheui:J .A.  not  only 
\voulcl  the lmclgetary  cost  of MCAs  disappear,  but there would.1Je  in addition a 
. ·bud.;eta::y. savii1g on  interventions and refunds as  a  .result of the :lo•,·cr average 
price level  in national  currencies  1  assurning that  tho  phasing out  of high 
positive ViGils  did not  involve  an  increase  in unit of account  prices.  Under 
Hypothesis 13,  the  10%  average  pr:i.oe  rise in national  currencies  ~-1ill  lead to 
increased  exi:>endi ture  on  inte1·vcntions and  refunds Hhich  \vill  to  some  extent 
offset  the  saving on IWAs.  (This  corresponds roughly with tho  situation ari::>i11g 
Hhen  l·~CAs  are phased out  under  the  existing AUA-based  Bystem.)  Under H.ypothe::;is 
C,  on the other hand,  the resulting variations in expenditure  on  rcf1.mdn  and 
interventjon are likely to be  very limited. 
'28.  Analysis of tb8 clifi'erences beh;een the  hypotheses must  n.lso  take 
accou1Yt  of the  dynamic  effects of the different price levels involved. 
,'  29.  As  regn.rds  food  aid,  the  export  refund  element uill b.c  affected in 
the  same  Hay  as FEOGA  guarantee  expenditure  (see  a·bove).  The  part  oorrs-:::pomlinr.; 
to the value at world market prices Hill  in any  case  be  expressed  in EUA  from - 12a-
1  Jnnua:e;y  1978,  r~fJ  2.  J'Cr-mJ.t  o.f.'  the  adoption of  -Lhis  unj_t  for thn purposes 
of th; J1udcct.  Con::;c(]U>.?:i1lly  this  la.ttr:~r  expcndi-t.urc  1-::i.D.  be  un~;ffcctecl IJY 
the  adoption of the  EUA  for ;ae:ciculturc. 
1' C'  l'  ~ ..,...., rc' r  CX')C"''J ~ t,,  ~  .  .,  un-~<~r·  +n' ·~  Ti'.f:.GGii'  Gl•.i  ,; "nee  ~cc·'·  j_ o·_,..,  •.  -~l1l'  r~"'  '·"  t;t.l"".  t.J  .  -~·  . "U.-l  >U ~  .....  - "  ~  l~  Uv.  ~  \,  -;  - "' 
are h:o  po::ssibilities.  For fi:::ccl  a.mo1.mto 1  the cffcds uill llc  analoc:;ous 
to  these  o't·served  above for :8..'\GGP  Gu,:nantee  expenditure.  In the  case  of 
maximur:1  <:unom1Jcs 1  hoi-;cve~·,  the  effect  is clifficult to ar;;ccrtain,  because it 
Hill  depend  on tho  extent to  i·:hich  the  amounts  granted ll,y  l~cmber States 
approach  the  maxiJ;Jum. 
III.  C01iCLUSIOll§ 
31.  r.I'he  present Agricui  tural Unit  of Accom1t  (ADA)  Has  desicncd  2.t 
a  ti:ne  of stable  excha.nge  rate  relations bct'decn all 1-Jcmbro:r  St.:ttcs.  Its 
value  is noH  linked. only to  the  Snake  currencies,  Hhici1  llavc  o.pprcciated. 
at:;ainst  the  C01rmuni ty average  since  1973.  IJ'he  Commiosion 9s  analyses  show 
that  the  u;:;e  of tJw  EUA  Hould  ha.vc  the advantage  of reflecting the  average 
econOJiiic  and  moncta.r'J  evolution of the  Corr.rnuni ty as  a  •·:hole  and  1wuld  make: 
it poscibl0  to  t<JJ<::e  account  of the  evolution of all tho  Col!:lnlmi ty  cu!-rencic::; 
ins·tead of eivin[;'  a  special  :col8  to the  Snake  currencies.  Its use  •·;ould 
also  eno.1)1e  the  annual  fixin&  o:f  corrunon  prices  1  uhich under the present  sy:::tcm 
are no  lont;er  an accurate  indicator of the .effective level of price  suppo1·t 
in the  Con:rnunity,  to be  carried out  in a  more  transparent  manner. 
32.  Use  o:f  the  EUA  Hould  also  have  the  institutional advantage  of harn:.oni-
zing the different units of account  used by the  Community,  lcadinc to greatc:c 
administrative  simplicity. 
33.  The  adoption of the  EUA  would  have  no  immediate  effect  on the  total 
of CoiDILuni ty expenditure  on ugricul  ture,  but  the  lona-term effect •·rould  depcnJ. 
on the  clyno.mic  effect of future price levels. - 13  -
3'1•  'l'hc  Commission's  am.\.l;yiws  also  re:VNll  that  'the  mni!'l  quewtions  rait:H:d 
by the introduction of a  nei·l  unit  of  acc01.~nt to the  common  agricultural poliey 
relv.te  to  i tc impact  on  the  common  price· level  and therefore  on  t:lC  di stri  bxsio:1 
•, 
oi'  I1'iCAs 1  and  on the  nn;~ure of HCAs  themselves~  ····· 
a)  A clccinion to adqpt  the  EUA  in p1ace  of the present  AUA  uould mean  tha·~, 
after the  day  of  S~-1i tchover,  common  prices Hould bo  expressed in EUA. 
The  differences in national  money  value8  bct~-:een the  AUA  2  .. nd thG  EUA  · 
t-rould  necessitate a  decision  on the  conversion rate to be  \1scd  at  the 
moment  of s,.li tchovcr.·  This Hould require a  decision affecti:1g the level 
of common  agricultural prices and of the distribution of existine MCAs. 
Several  options  for  COi1verting the AUA  to  the  EUA  are  open,  each  implying 
different  common  price levels.  Choice betueen these  options  \"lO'..lltl  be  a 
matter  for political  decision. 
b)  The  introduction of the  EUA  Noulcl  not  remove  the need  to fix and modify 
HCAs  in relation to  mo11ctary  chances. 
Continued monetary instability beyond the  da~r of Si·;itchovcr  would,  together 
v1ith  the  desire for price stability on  a[_,rricultural  markets,  create  a  flo;-r 
of net-~ NCAs  modifying the existing stock.  'rhe  application of the  EUA  i-.rould 
rcsal  t  in MCAs  that  were  varial)le  for all currencios. 
In. vie;-;  of the advantaces it ;-;ould bring,  the  Commission  favour::.  in 
principle the introduction of the  EUA  into the  com:non  agricultural policy. 
36..  Ho1·1ever  the  Commission  con:::iders  that,  under  present  circumstances, 
.'.the  introduction· of the. EUA  would raise fundamental  questions. concerning _  _t}1e 
common  agricultural policy.  Its l.mpli~a:t:1ons_ r_~quire  further--excWina~ion · 
~-and the  Commissfon fs .. not  submitt-ing  a-proposal at the  present" -stage·:  --I{~-~-:--. 
:intends to continua· :1 ts.  eXamil1a~ic:>ri  ..  of-~he- que:stion,  in---liaison wi'th 'the· --- ---
·::Member  S~ates,  and···:r·e-sei·ves  the  ___ pos-sibility--o'f ·auoi:nitting· a-proposal ·to the 
~~:~ouncil' at  a later--stage. 